A leadership deficit in the military

Last July, at a seminar in New Delhi on atmanirbharta, the then maintenance chief of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Air Marshal Sanjiv Ghuratia, delivered an address that contained, as one person in the audience reported “more Sanskrit than English or Hindi”. Another attendee wondered who Mr. Ghuratia was speaking to; the entrepreneurs and engineers in the audience or to the Sangh Parivar members who needed a demonstration of his Hindu credentials.

For generals, admirals or air marshals looking for post-retirement employment, Hindutva pays. Last month, Air Marshal Jeetendra Mishra, who masterminded Operation Sindoor as the Western Air Command chief, was rewarded with the plum job of running the Ram Janmbhoomi temple. Nothing an IAF pilot learns during his career equips him for such a delicate job in such a volatile environment.

This Hindutva-isation of the military is not new. On May 13, 2025 at a crucial IAF media briefing on Operation Sindoor, the IAF’s operations chief, Air Marshall A.K. Bharti, invoked the Ramayan. His briefing commenced with militaristic Hindutva overtones, the Shiva Tandava Stotram delivered in rock concert style. Military audiences in New Delhi are no longer surprised when government-affiliated speakers pepper their speeches with Sanskrit shlokas. For no apparent reason, the IAF appears to be more Sanskrit-ised than the other two services. One wag at a recent seminar commented, “it might be because they serve closer to God.” However, not every soldier is comfortable with overt displays of Hindutva. One can detect the growing disillusionment of juniors with seniors who are taking the Hindutva route to the top. 

Lions and donkeys

After the mass slaughter of World War I, a disillusioned British citizenry popularised the phrase “lions led by donkeys” to describe their military’s performance. This encapsulated their resentment against incompetent generals who let down British soldiers by committing units into attacks that were certain to fail.

This is not yet the case with the Indian military, which, as an institution, continues to enjoy the respect of the public. However on-going controversies have exacerbated murmurs among junior officers that the brass looks out only for themselves. On the other hand, generals express disappointment over the “poor quality” of young officers. There is a growing disconnect between the ends of the rank pyramid; between the lions and the donkeys.

Of the greatest concern is the growing “zero error syndrome” amongst senior Indian commanders. As was seen when the Chinese intruded into Ladakh in 2020, Indian commanders shrank from immediate offensive action. Instead, of creating deterrence by displaying aggression and risk-taking ability, the modern Indian general opts to defend vulnerabilities, underscoring weakness that is echoed by commanders down the line. It is not that operational boldness has blighted many careers. In the instances where Indian generals displayed conspicuous aggression against China — as in Nathu La in 1967, Sumdorong Chu in 1986, Doklam in 2017 and in the occupation of the Kailash Range in Ladakh in 2020-21 — the commanders in charge were praised, not castigated.

Contemporary conflict presents numerous examples of weaker forces stalemating, and even defeating stronger ones. Ukraine battles on against Russia, while Iran is standing up to the U.S. and Israel. The intangibles that boost their power are a mix of psychological factors. Soldiers thrive on emotional strength, belief in one’s own moral superiority, seeing justice in one’s own cause, fairness in processes and methods, and the conviction that soldierly skills will prevail over sycophancy. These moral factors are essential to national power.

Even in these communally polarised times, India’s military brass has the leeway to disagree with elected governments. To uphold their convictions, they should be ready to pay the price. No better example exists than the tussle between U.S. President Harry Truman and his commander in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur. Truman wanted a “limited war”, to avoid triggering a massive Soviet or Chinese intervention. MacArthur wanted an aggressive expansion of the war into China. Truman dismissed MacArthur in 1951, citing that elected leaders, and not military generals, decide foreign policy. MacArthur returned from Korea, an American hero. 

There is something gravely flawed with our leadership training. Many young officers start out as gallant captains and majors. Why then, when they become generals, admirals and air marshals do so many fail to seize the moment?

Ajai Shukla is Editor, Gambit Analytics LLP and Retired Colonel