Turkish Defence Minister Yasar Guler has clarified that Turkey will retain its military presence in Iraq and Syria until certain conditions are met.
The original justifications for Turkey’s cross-border deployments have dwindled in recent years. Now, analysts believe Ankara is offering new justifications for its open-ended military presence in these neighbouring states.
“We are maintaining our military presence in Iraq and Syria,” Guler said in a recent interview.
“When we assess that the necessary conditions have been met in terms of regional and border security, the status of our base areas and our presence in the region will be reconsidered.”
Open-ended conditions
Turkey sent troops into Syria in 2016. Its cross-border operations primarily focused on targeting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The SDF were a coalition formed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s main Syria affiliate, which became an invaluable ad hoc US ally against Islamic State (IS).
Early this year, following a Turkish-backed offensive by the new Syrian government of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the SDF agreed to integrate its fighters into the new Syrian military.
Complete SDF integration could remove Turkey’s decade-long justification for retaining troops in much of northern Syria.
“Ankara conditions its decision to withdraw from Syria not only on border security and the elimination of the terrorist threat in Syria, but also on the al-Sharaa government’s ability to establish state authority throughout the country,” Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, told The New Arab.
“This condition could signal Ankara’s desire to maintain a Turkish military presence and use it as leverage against, for example, Israel if tensions in southern Syria escalate into military confrontation between Syria and Israel.”
Consequently, Turkey’s military presence in Syria may continue even if there is a successful Kurdish peace process in Turkey.
“There may be mainly two minimal conditions: the total and actual disarmament of the PKK-linked groups in both Iraq and Syria, and the absence of Israeli military pressure on Syria,” Ozeren said.
In Iraq, Turkey has made repeated forays into northern Iraq’s Nineveh province and Iraqi Kurdistan as part of the conflict with the PKK. Turkey has had bases in these areas since the 1990s.
In the second half of the 2010s, it advanced deeper into the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, establishing and maintaining a vast network of outposts and forward-operating bases in strategic areas to relentlessly pressure the Kurdish fighters.
Now, with a major peace effort underway aimed at having the PKK lay down its arms for amnesties and a conclusive end to the conflict possibly on the horizon, Turkey’s justifications for these bases could become defunct.
Muaz Al-Abdullah, Middle East Research Manager at the conflict-tracking organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), specified that Guler’s remarks aren’t a withdrawal signal.
Rather, he was merely articulating the “latest version of an open-ended condition” which Ankara adjusts as events change.
“In 2024, Turkey tied any exit from Syria to a new constitution, elections and full border security. Earlier this year it said the Damascus-SDF deal was still not enough,” Abdullah told The New Arab.
“Withdrawal is possible, because the presence is costly for Turkey economically and politically, but it will be slow and conditional.”
He also outlined how the minimum conditions for withdrawal differ by country.
“In Iraq, the PKK must be disarmed and out of Sinjar and Qandil,” Abdullah said.
“Since the (Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia) Mecca alliance, Ankara’s concerns now also include the weapons of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and the threat they pose to Turkey’s ally Saudi Arabia, including PMF drone attacks on the Kingdom,” he added.
“In Syria, the minimum is a completed SDF integration, PKK cadres out of the northeast, and a Syrian army able to hold the border on its own.”
Reality on the ground
ACLED data has documented a rapid decrease in Turkish strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan in the past two years since the latest PKK peace talks began. In 2024, Turkey executed 4,861 strikes in the region. That fell rapidly to 634 in 2025, then to zero so far in 2026.
“The security case for staying is weakening, but the political conditions are not yet met,” Abdullah said.
In September, Turkey agreed to gradually withdraw from the Bashiqa base in Nineveh in tandem with Iraq’s removal of PKK-affiliated fighters from Nineveh’s Sinjar, the homeland of the Yazidi minority subjected to the 2014 IS genocide.
Abdullah described Turkey’s willingness to hand over Bashiqa as a “low-cost concession” rather than the start of any strategic withdrawal. Turkey only established its presence there a decade ago to train local forces battling IS. It is also the furthest base from Turkey’s border.
Nevertheless, it’s important since it is linked to a network of forward bases along the border that support Turkey’s broader counter-PKK mission.
“The handover is also a trade, not a gesture,” Abdullah said. “In return, Baghdad committed to establishing full state authority in Sinjar and removing PKK-linked groups."
The agreement also specifies a “gradual handover” tied to security steps taken on the Iraqi side. As a result, the withdrawal timeline is wide open to delay.
“The real test is on the ground,” Abdullah said. “An Iraqi commander expects Bashiqa to be vacated by the end of this year. If it is, that is a genuine signal. A phased withdrawal begins only when the forward bases start closing, not Bashiqa.”
Therefore, statements and agreements don’t reflect reality on the ground. What would be considered a clear signal that the Turkish withdrawal has begun, the ACLED expert added, is an “actual withdrawal on the ground rather than another statement of agreement between the two sides.”
Syria's status quo
Turkey’s support for Syrian government forces in their January offensive against the SDF proved vital. Ankara is still supporting Syrian government forces in their efforts to establish complete authority in hitherto SDF-controlled areas.
The situation remains unsettled, with ACLED’s Abdullah pointing to reports of armed groups, including the PKK-affiliated Revolutionary Youth Movement, opposed to the Damascus-SDF agreement still operating in those areas. Still, Turkey-Syria collaboration isn’t limited to the SDF.
“Basically, while the Turkish concerns are mainly related to the SDF/PKK activities in Syria, it is also related to the IS activities in Syria,” Abdullah said.
“So yes, the nature of the Syrian-Turkish relationship has changed mostly from cross-border operations and military support on the ground to more of intelligence and training collaboration.”
In his interview last week, Guler noted that Turkey has established “close coordination in the field of security” with Syria’s post-Assad authorities and seeks to “strengthen the capacity” of the new armed forces “to ensure the security of our borders.”
“While the al-Sharaa government has been pushing to take full control of the northern border and end Turkish military control there, Ankara has been pushing for at least a measured understanding with Damascus that would allow Turkish military presence to continue,” Ozeren said.
The Orion Policy Institute’s senior fellow contends that if the present Kurdish resolution process ultimately results in the PKK’s total disarmament and the return under amnesty of ex-PKK fighters to Turkey, then Ankara’s pretext for its military presence in Iraq will become unviable.
“However, two developments could alter the security landscape across the region: an expansion of the Saudi-led conflict with Iran-backed Houthis into a regional conflict, and an escalation of the US and Israel war against Iran into ground operations,” Ozeren told The New Arab.
“Such developments would force non-state actors, including PMFs in Iraq and PKK-linked groups in Iran and even Iraq, to reconsider current arrangements.”
That possibility could especially become a reality if Turkey decides to “pursue military involvement” through its commitments under the Mecca Defence Pact.
"If, and this is a big if, Damascus establishes full governance across the country, Turkey’s security- and defence-oriented influence may diminish, as the al-Sharaa government has tried to diversify its defence and military engagements with other actors,” he said.
In September, President al-Sharaa said that his country is “now entering the stage of giving legal status to the Turkish bases in northwestern Syria,” subject to the approval of the Syrian People’s Assembly.
He clarified that Syria does not have a long-term need for such foreign bases but also wants to “maintain diplomatic relations and mutual respect with neighbouring and friendly countries.”
ACLED’s Abdullah assesses that Sharaa’s statement implies that Syria doesn’t want any long-term Turkish presence on its soil to avoid turning the country into an arena of regional conflict.
That is especially urgent considering the growing tension between Turkey and Israel, which could transform Syria into a flashpoint between these two regional heavyweights.
Israel’s repeated targeting of Syrian airbases that Turkey evaluated for potential use demonstrated how quickly Turkey’s presence could potentially draw Syria into a regional confrontation.
“At the same time, Damascus cannot yet do without Turkish support,” Abdullah said. “As-Suweida remains unresolved, and IS and other groups may expand their activity.”
“Legal status for the bases is Damascus’s way of regulating Turkey’s presence now, so it can reduce that presence later."
In early August, Syria reached a memorandum of understanding on the future conditions of Russia’s access to the coastal naval and air bases of Tartus and Hmeimim under which the bases will become joint training centres after a three-month transitional process.
While Abdullah anticipates that’s the direction Damascus is pushing regarding the Turkish presence, he stressed that any comparison with Russia has significant limits.
“Russia’s presence is two bases far from Syria’s borders, and their value to Moscow is regional reach," he said. “Turkey’s presence sits on a 900-km land border and is tied to a security concern Ankara considers existential. That makes it much harder to reduce to a residual training mission.”
“Expect a smaller footprint over several years, but not a Turkey that fully leaves northern Syria.”
Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.
Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon
Edited by Charlie Hoyle