Shimon Sherman is a columnist covering global security, Middle Eastern affairs, and geopolitical developments. His reporting provides in-depth analysis on topics such as the resurgence of ISIS, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, judicial reforms in Israel, and the evolving landscape of militant groups in Syria and Iraq. With a focus on investigative journalism and expert interviews, his work offers critical insights into the most pressing issues shaping international relations and security.
(Oct. 26, 2026 / JNS)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu enters Tuesday’s election with an established political bloc but no guaranteed majority. Most polls project Likud, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionist–Zehut falling short of the 61 seats needed to form a government. Only Channel 14 polls consistently put the coalition above that threshold.
Martin Sherman, a senior researcher at the Israeli Defense and Security Forum, believes a decisive Netanyahu-bloc victory remains possible, although he acknowledges uncertainty about that assessment. “I tend to think more in terms of a decisive right-wing victory; this is definitely a possible outcome,” he told JNS.
Netanyahu has emphasized the importance of voter turnout, telling i24NEWS: “If we get the extra mandate or two extra mandates because people come out to vote, we’ll win, and if they don’t come out and stay home, we’ll lose.”
The intricate dynamics of coalition negotiations following Tuesday’s vote will largely define the constitution of the next government, with the election outcomes serving as a starting point for a different kind of political competition. In this competition, winners will not be defined purely by how many seats their party holds, or how many allies they have, but rather by the capacity to maneuver through the web of contradictory interests and clashing personalities to weave a stable government.
Professor Gideon Rahat, a senior fellow at the Israeli Democracy Institute, expects a prolonged contest between the competing parties. “It will take time; there will be a lot of complicated negotiations, and the election is just the first part,” he told JNS.
A 61-seat majority would provide the most straightforward path to another Netanyahu government. But falling short would not automatically remove him from office.
Rebuilding the natural coalition
Even if Netanyahu secures a parliamentary majority, rebuilding his traditional coalition will require resolving disputes among his existing partners. The most immediate obstacle is the haredi conscription issue, which prompted Shas and United Torah Judaism to withdraw from his coalition in July 2025.
Both parties have conditioned their participation in the next government on legislation regulating military exemptions for ultra-Orthodox yeshivah students. On Oct. 14, Shas Chairman Aryeh Deri declared: “There will be no government in Israel with Shas’s support or participation unless the status of yeshivah students is regulated.”
The difficulty extends beyond securing a political agreement. Although the Knesset passed a Basic Law recognizing Torah study as a fundamental national value in July 2026, it did not establish new conscription exemptions. The High Court has ordered enforcement of existing draft obligations, complicating efforts to introduce sweeping exemptions. Netanyahu supports new legislation but has acknowledged uncertainty over whether it can pass before a government is formed, leaving its contents and timing unresolved.
Other partners present additional demands. Otzma Yehudit leader Itamar Ben-Gvir has demanded the Defense Ministry for himself and the Justice Ministry for Tally Gotliv, while Religious Zionist–Zehut is pursuing an ambitious settlement and judicial agenda. Netanyahu has already pushed back against Ben-Gvir, stating: “I think the next defense minister should be from Likud.”
Moshe Feiglin’s Zehut presents an additional potential complication. Running alongside Smotrich’s Religious Zionist party in a technical alliance, Feiglin has pledged to recommend Netanyahu to the president as prime minister without conditions, despite arguing that he should have resigned following Oct. 7, 2023. Feiglin has also demanded the Defense Ministry portfolio and said he will demand significant changes to government policy, including a radically different approach to Gaza and an immediate cancellation of the Oslo Accords.
With a narrow majority, Netanyahu would have little room for internal dissent. Resolving these disagreements would be necessary not only to establish a coalition, but also to maintain its ability to govern.
Recruiting reinforcements
If Netanyahu’s established bloc falls short of a majority, his next opportunity lies with smaller parties operating outside the two main camps. However, their support comes with significant political conditions.
Ofer Winter’s Amcha Yisrael party could provide additional seats if it crosses the 3.25% electoral threshold. Winter initially pledged to recommend Netanyahu for prime minister, but questioned that commitment on Oct. 21, clarifying: “I’m part of the right-wing camp, and I’m not saying now that I’ll move to the other side.”
Winter’s demand for haredi military conscription could complicate negotiations with Shas and UTJ. Furthermore, the intense pressure campaign that Netanyahu has led against Winter during this election would make coalition negotiations complicated on a personal level.
Another potential source of support is the joint Reservists–Economic Party, led by Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelekha. The party demands universal military or national service and refuses to govern alongside ultra-Orthodox parties. Its position toward Netanyahu himself is less settled. While Zelekha has ruled out supplying the decisive vote for a Netanyahu-led coalition, Hendel has left open cooperation with Likud regardless of its leader, declaring: “I won’t sit with the haredi parties. If Likud can’t part ways with them, I won’t sit with Likud.”
The arithmetic presents an additional obstacle. Even securing both parties would require favorable electoral results and an agreement on conscription.
Splitting the opposition
If smaller parties cannot deliver a majority, Netanyahu could attempt to recruit lawmakers from the opposing bloc. Potential targets include right-wing members of B’Yachad, Yashar or Yisrael Beiteinu, particularly those uncomfortable with relying on Arab parties or Yair Golan’s The Democrats to form a government.
Such negotiations could take several forms. Entire parties could reverse their positions and join Netanyahu, while smaller groups of MKs could break away from their factions in exchange for ministerial portfolios or policy concessions. Under Israeli law, a recognized factional split generally requires at least one-third of a list’s MKs, with a minimum of two. Individual lawmakers can also cross the aisle, but those formally designated as defectors face restrictions on ministerial appointments and participation in future electoral lists.
The political obstacles are substantial. B’Yachad’s Naftali Bennett, Yashar’s Gadi Eisenkot, The Democrats’ Yair Golan and Yisrael Beiteinu’s Avigdor Liberman have all publicly rejected serving with Netanyahu.
Dr. Gayil Talshir of the political science department at the Hebrew University dismissed the prospect of opposition figures crossing over. “It is very unlikely that someone from the opposition is going to join Netanyahu,” she told JNS. Although such commitments do not legally bind every MK on their lists, no opposition lawmaker has publicly committed to joining Netanyahu. Nevertheless, even a limited number of defections could disrupt opposition coordination or help Netanyahu secure individual parliamentary votes without delivering a governing majority.
If these efforts fail, Netanyahu could find himself confronting an opposition-controlled Knesset while continuing to occupy the prime minister’s office.
The grand bargain
If splitting the opposition fails, Netanyahu’s remaining opportunity to establish a stable administration could lie in a broader unity coalition.
Education Minister Yoav Kisch, a member of Likud, has openly advocated expanding a Netanyahu-led government, declaring: “We’ll do all we can to enlarge this coalition, to join other parties from the other side.”
Such an arrangement could require Netanyahu to replace Ben-Gvir, Smotrich or the haredi parties with centrist or right-wing opposition factions. A rotation agreement on the prime ministership could help bridge leadership disputes, although Bennett, Eisenkot and Liberman have explicitly rejected serving under Netanyahu, including through a rotation agreement. On Oct. 21, Eisenkot reiterated his position, declaring: “I unequivocally pledge that I will not serve under Netanyahu in a rotation agreement. Period.”
Martin Sherman questioned whether a unity government could endure even if its leaders reached an agreement. “I don’t think that’s sustainable,” he said, pointing to the breakdown of the wartime partnership involving Netanyahu, Gantz and Eisenkot despite the pressure to maintain cooperation.
Their refusal creates another possibility: a unity government led by a different Likud lawmaker. Liberman has publicly identified a Netanyahu-free Likud as a potential coalition partner, while Eisenkot has also left that door open. Such an arrangement would allow Likud to retain significant governing influence, but require its lawmakers to accept replacing Netanyahu as prime minister.
A third possibility would be a compromise candidate acceptable to both camps, potentially emerging from negotiations between Bennett and Eisenkot or from outside their leadership circles.
The deadlock
If every coalition arrangement fails, Netanyahu could remain prime minister without forming a new government. Under Israeli law, the outgoing government continues serving until a replacement takes office, even if another election becomes necessary.
The government-formation process follows a defined timetable. The first candidate designated by the president receives 28 days, with a possible 14-day extension. If unsuccessful, the president can assign another candidate 28 days. A final 21-day period then allows 61 MKs to nominate an alternative candidate, who receives another 14 days. Failure to establish a government ultimately triggers another election within approximately 90 days.
President Isaac Herzog has pledged to avoid that outcome, declaring: “I really, truly will do all I can so there won’t be repeat elections.”
The 2027 state budget introduces another complication. The ordinary deadline for passage is March 31, although statutory exceptions can extend it under specific circumstances involving government formation. Failure to approve the budget by the applicable deadline automatically dissolves the Knesset and mandates a national election within about 90 days.
For Netanyahu, continued caretaker rule would preserve executive authority, subject to legal restrictions on certain decisions and appointments. However, it would not guarantee control over the newly elected Knesset or its legislative agenda.
The result could be Netanyahu remaining prime minister while his opponents control parliament, advance legislation, and potentially force another election without agreeing on an alternative government.