Tripoli, Libya - Six years ago, Libya’s Benghazi-based House of Representatives (HoR) unanimously rejected the 2019 maritime memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tripoli and Ankara.
Under Resolution No. 6/2020, the House severed political ties with Turkey and accused the former prime minister, foreign minister, and interior minister of high treason, referring them to the Attorney General.
Yet on 20 October 2026, the eastern-based HoR abruptly reversed its position, unanimously approving the maritime deal.
Parliament did not ratify the accompanying security pact, nor did it repeal the 2020 treason referrals - leaving it unclear if the Attorney General will act on a dormant mandate while the accused officials live openly in Tripoli.
The 2019 Istanbul agreements were born of an existential crisis for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). As Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) advanced within 10 kilometres of the capital, Ankara provided a vital military lifeline at a heavy political price.
The package comprised two parallel instruments: a security pact deploying drones and mercenaries to rout the LNA, and a maritime MoU securing Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean ambitions.
Both pacts sparked immediate outrage, with critics arguing a besieged GNA could not bargain freely. One Libyan border expert, who wished to remain anonymous, told The New Arab that the arrangement was a clear “case of blackmail” of a desperate government.
Others, however, reject that description. Mohamed Taher Siala, Libya’s foreign minister at the time and one of the agreement’s signatories, told The New Arab that criticism of the deal would only be fair “if it fails to serve the [Libya] country's national interests”.
In his view, Tripoli conceded nothing to Ankara. Instead, it secured a substantial expansion of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), unlocking vital offshore oil and gas reserves.
That perspective is shared by Baghdadi Saleh, a retired Libyan border expert, who verified that the maritime MoU does not deprive Libya of a single square meter of territory. Speaking to The New Arab, Saleh noted that the deal effectively “does not infringe” on Libya’s rights.
Yet, despite these potential territorial gains, the circumstances of 2019 have rendered both MoUs deeply controversial. Besides the HoR’s rejection, regional countries including Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus rejected the maritime boundaries as a direct violation of their own rights, while the European Union declared the deal legally null and void.
This history makes the HoR’s ratification of the deal all the more striking, raising the central question: what has changed in 2026 to make former adversaries embrace an agreement they once condemned as high treason?
Haftar's shift towards Turkey
Between 2019 and 2026, two developments help explain the HoR’s reversal. The first is the change in its leadership, with Al-Salhin Abdulnabi replacing Aguila Saleh, who had occupied the speakership since 2014.
The second, and likely the most important, is the recent pragmatic rapprochement between Haftar’s camp and Turkey.
Seven years after the military conflict, the former adversaries are moving closer. Ankara has consolidated its position in western Libya while increasingly engaging with Saddam Haftar, who is not only deputy to his father but also hoping to become president of Libya one day. Closer relations with Ankara could certainly serve his ambitions.
For Khalifa Haftar, meanwhile, cultivating ties with Turkey offers a way to advance his family’s political influence, even if his own long-standing ambition of governing Libya remains unrealised.
The 2019–2020 LNA military campaign on Tripoli was accompanied by a bitter war of words that makes today’s rapprochement all the more striking.
At the time, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan branded Haftar a “putschist,” while Haftar denounced Turkey as an occupying power and called for mobilisation against a “Turkish invasion”.
Egypt, meanwhile, backed Haftar fully. In June 2020, as Turkish-backed forces advanced toward Sirte, President Sisi declared the city a “red line” and threatened direct military intervention - a move publicly backed by then-HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh.
This confrontation went far beyond maritime boundaries, with Ankara and Cairo backing opposing camps and raising the spectre of a wider regional conflict.
Regional tensions
Reactions to the HoR’s reversal came quickly, led by Greece and Egypt, which rejected not only the agreement but also the legal effect of its ratification.
The Greek Foreign Minister declared that “the memorandum will not be implemented under any circumstances” because “it is illegal.” Cairo stated that the ratification had no “legal consequences for Egypt”.
The European Union followed, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa reiterating the bloc’s opposition and expressing solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.
Meanwhile, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, issued a further statement reiterating the EU’s rejection. Israel also strongly condemned the ratification while accusing Ankara of destabilising the region.
Washington’s response was more restrained. On 22 October, a US State Department spokesperson urged all parties to resolve maritime disputes through negotiations. Greece briefed the UN Security Council on the matter.
The controversy surrounding Turkey’s footprint in Libya is not confined to high-level diplomatic calculations or military bases - it extends directly into daily life in the capital.
In Tripoli’s Zawiyat al-Dahmani neighbourhood, the Turkish Embassy’s long-standing closure of a primary public road has become a persistent local grievance.
Security roadblocks have exacerbated the city’s severe traffic congestion, disrupting local businesses and often obstructing emergency access to the nearby Eye Hospital. The Turkish Embassy was contacted for comment, but no response was received by the time of publication.
The dispute serves as a local microcosm of the broader friction defining the Turkey–Libya relationship: a dynamic where foreign security arrangements regularly override public accountability and everyday Libyan rights.
Maritime ambitions, uncertain returns
In August 2022, then-Oil and Gas Minister Mohamed Aoun expressed approval of the deal, saying it gave Libya access to “vast maritime areas”.
His point is echoed by pro-Haftar commentator Ahmed Alhossein, who told The New Arab that the MoU should be viewed positively “as long as it secures Libya’s interests”.
But for other analysts, the main question is whether Libya is actually ready to exploit this vast maritime area.
Since 2011, the country has been struggling to manage and develop even its less costly onshore oil production and its existing infrastructure, let alone attract the huge investment needed for offshore exploration in disputed waters.
In the politically unstable country, violence could erupt at any moment and “oil production is regularly interrupted and sometimes stopped for months”, the Libyan border expert told The New Arab.
Major oil potential partners are unlikely to commit millions of dollars to contested offshore areas in this environment of instability.
The agreement has also put Libya at odds with Greece and Cyprus, backed by the European Union. The dispute could ultimately end up being decided through international legal proceedings, which are often lengthy, adding further uncertainty for investors.
Many Libyans argue that their country, already deeply weakened, needs fewer disputes, not more, particularly with its immediate neighbours and trading partners such as the EU.
Any potential gains from offshore resources must be weighed against the diplomatic, legal, and investment risks the agreement could create.
The question is not simply what Libya might gain, but whether those potential benefits will outweigh the problems the agreement could bring.
Mustafa Fetouri is an award-winning Libyan journalist, columnist, author, and translator, with contributions to major outlets like Middle East Monitor, Al-Monitor, and Washington Report, and a focus on North Africa and the Sahel region
Follow him on X: @MFetouri
Edited by Charlie Hoyle