On October 11, Pakistan’s federal government imposed emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, suspendedthe Sohail Afridi-led provincial government of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, and placed the province under governor’s rule. President Asif Ali Zardari approved the Shehbaz Sharif government’s decision under Articles 232 and 234 of the Constitution of Pakistan, citing the provincial administration’s alleged failure to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The move came as the PTImobilised supporters for a march demanding Imran Khan’s release from prison and restoration of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy across Pakistan.
The government took the pretext of a grave security problem in the province and the provincial government’s non-cooperation with the federal government in containing threats from militants in the region. But the timing of this move has raised several uncomfortable questions about the country’s democratic state of affairs and the role of the military establishment therein. The intervention in KP is the latest episode in which elected governments could be weakened or removed while the military retains the institutional power to shape the boundaries of civilian authority.
The role of Pakistan Army in the country’s politics cannot be understood simply as a succession of coups. Its influence has also operated through electoral alliances, intelligence networks, pressure on political parties and interventions that determine which civilian leaders can govern. While the coups allowed the military establishment to rule directly, they also facilitated the infiltration of military officials into civil administrations when the military was not in power.
This has a long history. The political instability following independence, the weakness of the parliamentary system, and the importance of security on the state agenda have helped consolidate the influence of the military and the civil bureaucracy. In 1958, General Ayub Khan took power through a coup within a coup against President Iskandar Mirza, who had dissolved the constitution with the military’s help. General Yahya Khan followed the path of General Ayub Khan in 1969. This was followed by the military’s refusal to hand over power after the Awami League’s victory in the 1970 elections, which led to the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who colluded with General Yahya Khan against Mujib ur Rahman, was overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, whereas General Pervez Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif in 1999.
These were not merely interruptions in a fledgling democratic system which eventually failed to take strong institutional roots and is yet to mature. Each takeover weakened the institutions that might have held the military establishment accountable. As Hasan Askari Rizvi argues in The Military and Politics in Pakistan (1986), these interventions made Pakistan a state in which the armed forces acquired the capacity to dominate core political institutions and processes. Four decades later, Rizvi’s analysis remains equally relevant, with the military establishment’s influence outlasting individual generals and elected governments because it rests on institutional resources, organisational cohesion and a civilian political class that has often struggled to act collectively in defence of democratic rules.
Take the record of Pakistan Army’s interference in the electoral affairs of the country. It has been accused of interfering in the electoral process for decades. Back in 2012, Pakistan’s Supreme Court, in the Asghar Khan case, established that senior military intelligence officers had distributed money to influence the 1990 election against Benazir Bhutto in favour of Nawaz Sharif. The 2024 general election showed how the Army establishment went overboard, using all systemic powers, including judicial powers, to deny Imran Khan and PTI a chance to win the contest as a cohesive bloc. Candidates backed by the PTI were forced to contest as independents after the Election Commission withdrew its electoral symbol and the Supreme Court legalised it.The election saw brazen electoral manipulation through tampering with Form 47, as highlighted by multiple agencies, including those caught on social media. Yet a majority of Khan’s nominees won.
The campaign against the PTI after the violence of May 9, 2023, further exposed this imbalance. Following Khan’s arrest, Pakistan saw spontaneous countrywide anti-establishment protests with people attacking military installations and other state property across cities and towns. The subsequent crackdown, involving arrests of party leaders, pressure on politicians to leave the PTI and trials of hundreds of civilians in military courts, raised concerns about due process and the political space available to the opposition. Khan’s continued imprisonment and the legal cases against him have further deepened the perception that state institutions have become entangled in a political contest.
The military’s consolidation under General Asim Munir has made these concerns more pressing. During his tenure, Pakistan has witnessedconstitutional changes, such as extensions of service chiefs’ tenures and the concentration of command under the army chief, which have strengthened the position of the military leadership. Civilian politicians have helped advance changes that weaken the principle of civilian oversight, even as they defend their own authority against political rivals.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to blame the military alone for such actions. The Bhuttos and the Sharifs have done similar things in the past as well; they have dismissed elected provincial governments, imposed governor’s rule, and exercised force against opponents. It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who dismissed the Balochistan government in 1973 and who may be remembered as a champion of democracy. In 1994, Benazir Bhutto imposed governor’s rule in then North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Nawaz Sharif’s governments also benefited from certain arrangements that were made by the establishment earlier, and they became the target of the establishment later.
However, civilian misbehaviour and military interference differ in their impact. Political parties vie for power and can be voted out of office through elections. The army commands an institution with its own hierarchy and security concerns. The military’s involvement in the country’s intelligence services, security policy, and political transition process enables it to employ measures that political parties cannot. Civilian leaders can benefit from military support when trying to weaken their political opponents.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa now presents another test. The federal government must demonstrate that emergency rule is necessary, proportionate and consistent with the Constitution, and that it will not be used to extinguish the PTI’s political presence. The province’s security crisis warrants effective action, but the removal of elected authority should not serve as a substitute for accountable governance.
Pakistan cannot build a durable democracy while its political leaders treat constitutional rules as tactical instruments and its military remains the ultimate arbiter of political outcomes. The army’s dominance is the more enduring structural problem because it survives changes of government and party leadership. Civilian politicians have repeatedly helped sustain that dominance. Until they recognise that the democratic rules protecting their opponents are the same rules that protect them, Pakistan will remain trapped in a system where the military sets the limits of politics and elected leaders negotiate within them.
Arun Anand, Indian Affairs Editor to Blitz is an author and columnist who has penned more than a dozen books. He contributes columns on geopolitics to leading Indian and international publications and research journals. Follow him on ‘X’
@ArunAnandLive