Taiwan’s future must be determined by Taiwanese. No foreign power has the right to make that choice for them, nor should the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) be allowed to interfere in Taiwan’s elections through misinformation campaigns, political infiltration or other means.
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other. Taiwanese exercise their sovereignty by electing public officials through democratic institutions.
The ballot represents the people’s right to determine the direction of their government and their country. If external forces are allowed to distort information, sow panic or fabricate public opinion, it is not merely an individual candidate who suffers, but also the rights of all citizens to choose their own representatives.
According to an operational report by the National Security Bureau, about 2.5 million pieces of potentially contentious information were recorded between January and September this year. That figure serves as a reminder that the Internet can be a battleground exploited by foreign forces.
However, the collection of information does not mean that every item has been verified as being manipulated by foreign actors. The government should clarify its findings and distinguish between confirmed, suspected and pending items of misinformation, and cases in which foreign involvement has been ruled out.
This would help the public understand the nature of the threats to democracy, while avoiding the blanket labeling of all political speech or election campaigning as cognitive warfare.
Countermeasures against foreign election interference require more than slogans; they must be supported by clear evidentiary standards. Coordinated activity by fake accounts, identity impersonation, foreign funding or chains of command and the spread of disinformation are all leads that warrant thorough investigation.
However, judgements should not be based solely on the volume of online activity, repetitive messaging or political affiliations. National security agencies should focus on identifying foreign interference and presenting evidence that can be independently scrutinized. Matters involving classified information can also be subject to oversight through closed-door sessions at the Legislative Yuan.
If intelligence is selectively cited, it can undermine public trust and the integrity of national security agencies. When senior government officials refer to directives from the CCP to interfere in Taiwan’s elections, they should explain the intelligence behind these claims and the extent to which they have been verified.
If the claims have not yet been substantiated, that should be made clear to prevent national security warnings from becoming ammunition used in election campaigns. Only through consistent standards and sufficient evidence can efforts to counter election interference build a broad public consensus rather than deepen political divisions.
In the face of foreign threats, Taiwan needs more sophisticated intelligence gathering, reliable cybersecurity protections and an electorate that can verify information and refuse to share suspicious content. Above all, Taiwan’s elections must be decided by Taiwanese.
Protecting electoral integrity means protecting democracy, and safeguarding people’s votes means safeguarding national sovereignty.
Chen Ching-yun is a former director of the Legislative Yuan’s Bureau of Legal Affairs.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen