WASHINGTON—Timing the release of strategies is difficult. The European Union (EU) knows this better than most, particularly when it comes to the Arctic. It released its 2021 Arctic policy mere months before Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine, which challenged the fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity undergirding Arctic governance.
The EU unveiled a new strategy last week in an equally fluid environment. Iceland voted no in its referendum to resume EU membership negotiations in August, and the United States, Greenland, and Denmark negotiated an updated agreement in September. Meanwhile, Russia is investing in and expanding its military assets in the region.
But Europe has not been sitting idly by. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined her security priorities for the Arctic in her address at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January. In September, the Commission announced a €200 million funding package directed at Greenland. A few weeks later, von der Leyen offered Canada an invitation to cooperate on an unprecedented level, proposing that it become the first “associate member” of the EU—an arrangement which the partners will further refine in the upcoming Canada-EU Summit in Montreal at the end of October.
Whether this strategy will complement or compete with future US and NATO strategies for the region remains to be seen. Regardless, with its new strategy, the European Commission is positioning itself as an Arctic actor capable of holding its own with great powers in the north.
What’s inside the strategy
The EU’s 2026 Arctic strategy is ambitious. It focuses bureaucratic heft and significant resources on four core pillars: cooperation, security and resilience, economic prosperity, and communities and connectivity. It is responsive to threats member states face today, including hybrid attacks, radio-frequency interference, cyberattacks, and sabotage targeting critical land-based and subsea infrastructure.
The most promising elements focus on the adoption and rollout of research initiatives and technologies that could reshape life in the Arctic. That includes space-based services and power grid and rail connectivity, sending a clear signal to national governments and industry on the need to prioritize interoperable Arctic capabilities. These activities fall well within the EU’s core competencies and support the goals of Arctic member states.
The less successful elements offer unclear policy direction and add redundant bureaucracy. The Maritime Security Hub is one example. While admirable in its ambitions, the proposal risks duplicating efforts by NATO, the International Maritime Organization, and other bodies that facilitate information-sharing and translate domain awareness into action.
However, on the whole, the strategy offers a more proactive, forward-looking vision for the region.
While the United States is only referenced seven times in the document, elements of the strategy read as a response to Trump administration initiatives. The section on expanding European icebreaker capacity, for example, seems to be Brussels’ answer to the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact) between the US, Canada, and Finland. It brings little new to the table, with one notable exception: a reference to future availability of nuclear-powered icebreakers, which are currently only built in Russia.
The EU is also stepping in to fill a void left in the wake of US cuts to programs at the National Science Foundation and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration with new environmental monitoring initiatives, including one called OceanEye. The subtext reveals simmering anxieties about the US approach to the region, especially as the United States continues to characterize the Arctic as a zone of contestation and competition. Multiple mentions in the EU strategy of working with like-minded partners could be interpreted as trepidation about the future trajectory of the United States in the region. The significant emphasis on cooperation with Greenland and Canada and concerns about sovereignty and dependency represent the EU marketing itself to member states and partners as an actor capable of holding its own with the great powers in the Arctic.
What has changed since 2021
The 2021 EU Arctic Policy was a victim of circumstance given its release in October 2021, just months before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine upended Europe’s security landscape. Although this policy—the first of its kind for the EU—stuck to core Arctic themes, there were key blunders, including the ill-received moratorium on oil and gas exploration in the Arctic. Climate change was singled out as the most comprehensive threat facing the region, a far cry from the updated and more security-oriented edition. One tangible takeaway from the first iteration was the opening of an EU representation office in Nuuk in 2024 to strengthen EU-Greenland cooperation.
Ultimately, the 2021 strategy was a helpful exercise for the EU to espouse a clear policy toward the Arctic region, firmly rooted in its pre-2022 worldview. However, this strategy was both too broad and lacking in clear deliverables to meaningfully advance EU interests in the Arctic region, particularly after Russia disrupted peace in Europe with its full-scale invasion.
Accordingly, the EU’s narrative toward the Arctic region has shifted since 2021. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to a schism in the Arctic policy community, frustrating cooperation within the Arctic Council and adding urgency to greater situational awareness in the High North. Finland and Sweden’s subsequent accession to NATO significantly reframed the Arctic theater and shifted the Alliance’s center of gravity further north. Growing Russia-China cooperation, including China’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, has an Arctic dimension that manifests as growing economic activity and coast guard or other military presence in the region.
Elements of the EU’s 2021 policy survive in the new (and more confident) strategy. While there is a softer framing on hydrocarbon exploration and extraction in the 2026 strategy, the intent to keep those resources in the ground remains the same. The 2026 strategy also builds and expands on the EU’s cooperation with Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Norway, and Iceland, shown in part by the increased number of times they are mentioned.
As the Arctic heats up, the European Union provides a fresh offer to the region and its inhabitants through its updated strategy. The timing of this strategy, particularly as tensions over Greenland cool, allows for a more constructive tone that can steer EU policy for the long term. At times, there has been discomfort, including among some member states, with the EU taking an assertive approach to the region; this strategy, while still ambitious, strikes a better balance, playing to its strengths while taking a more deferential approach to areas of national jurisdiction.