THE MASSACRE of three Meitei civilians collecting firewood on 19 October 2026 by Kuki National Front-Nehlun, followed by the dumping of two victims’ bodies at the gate of Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh’s official residence, was an indictment of a government whose condemnations of violence have failed to translate into effective action.
The subsequent raid on Sinai Camp in Kangpokpi district has raised more questions than answers. Rather than confront the failures exposed by the killings of about 100 civilians since the beginning of this year, the government appears eager to turn a security operation conducted under public pressure into a political achievement. The Sleeper-Dancer Chief Minister’s helicopter visit to the camp on 25 October, publicised as the first visit by a sitting Manipur Chief Minister to a designated Suspension of Operations (SoO) camp, risks becoming political theatre that distracts from the urgent questions of accountability.
The visit did little to clarify the whereabouts of missing Kuki National Army (KNA) and Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) cadres and their weapons. Reports that arrested cadres said missing personnel had gone to wage war against Nagas along IT Road in Kangpokpi district and in Ukhrul and Kamjong districts raise further concerns. Where are the missing personnel and their weapons, and what is happening at other designated camps?
A camp meant for 159 cadres, but only one verified
On 20 October, security forces raided Sinai Camp, associated with the KNA and KLA, both under the Kuki National Organisation (KNO). The camp was supposed to accommodate 159 cadres—93 from the KNA and 66 from the KLA. Yet, only 18 people were found there.
Security forces seized 24 firearms, 38 magazines, ammunition, explosives, wireless communication equipment and other combat gear. These findings raise serious questions about cadre verification, weapons control and camp oversight. Who authorised the presence of the alleged impostors, and did camp functionaries or senior commanders know about these irregularities?
If authorities cannot verify personnel and weapons even at one designated camp, the public has every reason to question their oversight of the wider network.
Political theatre cannot replace accountability
Security forces raided Sinai Camp after three civilians had been killed and public outrage had erupted. The Sleeper-Dancer Chief Minister arrived by helicopter only after the operation. What is there to celebrate when only one of the 159 expected cadres was initially identified as registered, while the whereabouts of the others and their weapons remained unclear?
The visit does not explain why the camp’s apparent irregularities were not detected earlier or why similar enforcement has not been demonstrated at other designated camps. Why did decisive action come only after dead bodies were brought to the Chief Minister’s gate?
The priority must be disarmament and abrogation, not relocation
The relocation of Sinai Camp to Sijang under Saikul subdivision in Kangpokpi district is no longer the central issue. With the SoO arrangement reportedly having expired on 4 September 2026 without renewal, the government’s priority must be to end the arrangement through the appropriate legal process and disarm the armed groups involved. Moving cadres from one camp to another would leave the underlying problem unresolved.
The government’s takeover of Sinai Camp has been welcomed by members of the public, including the Thadou and other communities, who want decisive action against armed groups operating under the SoO arrangement. They expect the same action at every designated camp, with all cadres accounted for and unauthorised weapons lawfully seized. The operation must not remain confined to Sinai. All camps of Kuki militant groups must be dealt with consistently, the armed groups lawfully disarmed, and the SoO arrangement brought to an end without further delay. Anything less would raise serious questions about selective enforcement and whether Kuki armed groups are being allowed to retain their influence for political purposes, including electoral advantage.
ALSO READ: The Tide of Accountability Is Rising in Manipur
On 23 October, Manipur Home Minister Govindas Konthoujam stated in a media interview that the SoO agreement covering Kuki militant groups under the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF) had expired on 4 September and had not been renewed. He declared, “The violation of SoO ground rules does not arise” and “there is no SoO agreement [that] exists in the state.”
With the arrangement expired, why has the government not launched similar operations against KNO and UPF camps and cadres, including their leaders? This must extend beyond the KNO and UPF groups to include their proxies such as the KNA-Burma, KNF (Nehlun), and armed “Village Volunteers” (VVs). Security forces and the Indian Army conduct combing operations against other armed groups, including the United Kuki National Army (UKNA) and Naga and Meitei militant groups, even in remote hill areas of Churachandpur—reportedly using army helicopters in operations against the UKNA—as well as other hill districts and the valley. Why, then, are KNO and UPF cadres and leaders reportedly still operating freely within civilian communities?
Enforcement must not be confined to designated camps. The government must take lawful and consistent action against all Kuki militant groups operating across Manipur and beyond, including the Manipur-based KNA proxy, the KNA-Burma, investigate their activities, secure their weapons, and ensure that no armed organization receives preferential treatment or operates beyond the reach of the law. If more than 2,000 Kuki SoO militants remain part of the wider network, where are they, what weapons do they possess, and what action will be taken to disarm them?
The SoO ground rules prohibited recruiting new cadres. Those who were 18 when the agreement was first signed in 2008 would now be 36, while those who were 28 would now be 46. How, then, should the apparent presence of numerous cadres under 35 be explained? Are they registered cadres recruited before the restrictions, or does their presence point to possible breaches of the no-recruitment rule? Age alone does not prove a violation, but the government must audit identities, registration dates and service records to establish the facts.
Political connections must not shield armed groups
Another troubling aspect of Manipur’s crisis is the reported overlap between political networks and armed organisations. Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen is the wife of Thangboi Kipgen, president of the Kuki National Front (KNF-P), a SoO group under the United People’s Front (UPF). Kimneo Haokip Hangshing, the Saikul MLA, is the wife of the chairman of the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), a SoO armed group under the KNO.
Other MLAs—including Saikot MLA Paolienlal Haokip, associated with the KNO/KNA; Henglep MLA Letzamang Haokip, associated with the KNO/KNA & KNF-MC, etc; Saitu MLA Haokholet Kipgen, associated with the UPF/KNF; and Tengnoupal MLA Letpao Haokip, associated with the KNO/KNA and UPF/UKLF—all have close family ties and vested interests linked to leaders of Kuki SoO militant groups operating in their respective areas. These relationships warrant scrutiny in light of concerns about the political influence of armed groups and the enforcement of SoO ground rules.
Kuki SoO militant groups sponsored candidates in areas where they operated, while political leaders supported these groups, creating a reciprocal political relationship. Before the 2022 Manipur Assembly election, the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF) publicly endorsed BJP candidates in their respective areas of operation. These endorsements demonstrated the political influence exercised by armed organisations under the SoO arrangement, formalised in 2008.
Family ties between political leaders and SoO militant leaders, coupled with electoral endorsements and political support, highlight the close connections between armed organisations and electoral politics in Manipur. These relationships must be examined in the context of the influence and control exercised by Kuki armed militant groups and their proxies, including so-called Kuki CSOs such as Kuki Inpi, KSO, etc., over civilian life, political processes, and elections, effectively enabling them to function as parallel authorities. No political leader or armed organisation should be beyond scrutiny or accountability under the law.
Extortion, illegal taxation, intimidation, restrictions on movement, and interference in elections, government affairs and civilian community life demonstrate the extensive power exercised by armed groups. The prevalence of violence in areas where Kuki militant groups operate raises serious concerns about their coercive control over civilian populations and the failure to ensure effective law enforcement and public safety.
Thadou organisations, including Thadou Inpi Manipur (TIM) and Thadou Community International (TCI), have repeatedly raised concerns about Kuki armed groups that are exercising parallel authority, intimidating civilians, and interfering in political processes, particularly targeting members of the Thadou community. The Thadou community has endured prolonged and severe suffering from Kuki armed militancy, given that these groups operate predominantly in areas inhabited by Thadous. The scale and duration of this suffering underscore the impact of Kuki chauvinism on the Thadou community.
On 31 August 2025, TIM submitted a 35-page memorandum to the Central and state governments demanding the total abrogation of the SoO arrangement and documenting evidence of alleged violations of ground rules. The Sinai raid reinforces the need to investigate these concerns and assess whether the arrangement has achieved its stated objectives.
Manipur needs answers, not another political performance
The government must account for missing cadres, investigate the alleged impersonation, establish the whereabouts of weapons, inspect all designated camps and pursue lawful disarmament. It must also ensure a full and impartial investigation into the killings of the three civilians.
The people of Manipur should not have to endure another killing and public uprising before the government acts. The Chief Minister must explain what his government knew, what it failed to do, and what measures it will take to prevent further killings. He must also clearly state whether his government is committed to abrogating the SoO agreement and, if so, what concrete steps it has already initiated to bring the arrangement to an end and ensure the complete disarmament of the armed groups.
The real test of leadership is not whether the Chief Minister can fly to a camp after security forces have raided it, and pose for a photograph. It is whether his government can account for missing personnel and weapons, apply the law consistently, bring the SoO arrangement to an end through the appropriate legal process, and protect civilians before more lives are lost.
ALSO READ: Beyond Degrees and Government Jobs: Unlocking Nagaland’s Human Potential
The Sinai Camp raid has raised more questions than answers. The government must stop presenting it as a political achievement and treat it as a call for accountability and decisive action against armed militant groups no longer covered by the SoO arrangement. The law must be enforced consistently, all cadres and weapons must be accounted for, and operations must extend beyond Sinai Camp to include both the cadres and their leaders, dismantling the wider network of armed groups operating across Manipur.
The Suspension of Operations (SoO) arrangement with Kuki armed militant groups under the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and United People’s Front (UPF) has failed miserably on all fronts and must be abrogated without further review or extension. Numerous organisations, members of the public from both the valley and the hills, and political parties have called for its abrogation. The government must respect these demands and terminate the arrangement without further delay.
(The views expressed are personal. The author, Jalun Haokip (MSW), is a Melbourne-based native of Manipur with professional experience in social work across mainstream and Indigenous Australian communities. He currently works as a family violence practitioner within the Victorian Government in Melbourne.)