A joint investigation by Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) and the “Women Who Won the War” platform has uncovered a pattern of coordinated digital campaigns targeting Syrian dissidents, female journalists, and women activists throughout 2025 and 2026. According to the report, several of these operations originated inside a private WhatsApp group co‑managed by officials in the Ministry of Information, before being disseminated across social media and amplified by networks of low‑activity accounts.
The investigation examined data from more than 8,000 accounts, reviewed engagement across over 40 public pages and profiles, and analyzed leaked transcripts from closed messaging groups. Journalists also interviewed targeted individuals and digital security specialists.
The findings document three cases in which online harassment escalated beyond character defamation to affect personal safety, disrupt professional activity, and, in one instance, culminate in arbitrary detention and judicial proceedings.
From Closed Groups to Amplified Campaigns
One of the most prominent campaigns unfolded ahead of a planned sit‑in at Damascus’s Youssef al‑Azmeh Square on April 17, 2026. Activists and citizens intended to protest deteriorating living conditions, rising prices, and restrictions on civil liberties.
Leaked messages from a WhatsApp group operated by the Rural Damascus Media Directorate revealed coordination among Ministry of Information officials and journalists to mobilize public opinion against the protest two days before it took place.
Following instructions circulated within the group, journalist Alaa al‑Ahmad launched a hashtag. Group members then drafted an anti‑protest statement under the name “Journalists and Activists of Rural Damascus” and distributed it across multiple digital channels.
Investigators found the statement replicated almost verbatim across dozens of pages, accompanied by posts portraying protesters as remnants of the former regime or agents of Iran.
An analysis of more than 40 accounts involved in the April 15–16 counter‑campaign revealed patterns consistent with coordinated inauthentic behavior. Many profiles lacked basic indicators of genuine activity, featuring no profile photographs, minimal public posts, and as few as five connected friends. The investigation concluded that these networks operate in tandem, with primary accounts posting content and secondary accounts inflating engagement to create the appearance of widespread public support.
Responding to the allegations, Fadi Shabat, head of the Digital Media Department at the Rural Damascus Media Directorate, denied that his office manages fake or burner accounts. He stated that directing public opinion falls outside his department’s remit and rejected any administrative link between the directorate and the counter‑protest campaign.
Content Manipulation and Defamation
The report also examined the case of Heba Ezzeddin al‑Hajji, CEO of the “Justice and Empowerment” organization. On April 19, 2025, Hajji posted on Facebook about an encounter with a young woman believed to be among those abducted during recent security incidents along the Syrian coast. She called on authorities to investigate the woman’s whereabouts.
Within 24 hours, coordinated pages reframed her post, falsely alleging that she claimed a “slave market” existed in Idlib. The investigation confirmed that her original post focused solely on determining the missing girl’s fate. The smear campaign intensified through truncated audio clips attributed to al‑Hajji and unverified claims accusing her of acting as an informant for the former Assad regime.
Hajji stated that her organization’s offices in Kafruhum were closed by the Political Affairs Directorate the following day, officially under the pretext of “ensuring her protection.” Government representatives cited in the report denied knowledge of these details or any administrative action taken against her.
From Online Incitement to Detention
The investigation also highlighted the case of Nour Suleiman, a member of the Syrian Democratic Coalition. Suleiman was arrested at the Political Security branch in Damascus’s Mazzeh district on July 26, 2025, following a digital outrage campaign triggered by a Facebook post that she later deleted and apologized for.
According to Suleiman’s account, security forces raided her home twice and detained her father before arresting her. She was instructed to report to the branch to delete a video she had recorded during the initial raid. She was held for three days without formal charges before being released.
Judge Hossam Khattab, Public Prosecutor in Damascus, stated on July 31 that Suleiman was released due to procedural irregularities surrounding her summons, while noting that legal proceedings for “inciting sectarianism and spreading hatred” remain ongoing.
In its response to ARIJ, the Ministry of Information acknowledged that the initial arrest occurred without a judicial warrant. The ministry stated that former Information Minister Hamza Mustafa intervened to secure her release due to the lack of legal authorization, while confirming that a subsequent warrant was issued.
During the online campaign targeting Suleiman, a verified account under the name “Manar Hamsho” published a post on July 29, 2025, advocating for her torture and justifying abuses in detention. The post received more than 1,300 interactions through March 2026. Data tracking revealed that several accounts amplifying posts against Suleiman had participated in similar campaigns targeting other activists, including Farah Youssef, indicating a recurring network infrastructure.
Fabricated Chats and Reputation Smears
A third case involved Istanbul‑based media writer Alaa Amer. The investigation found that Amer was targeted by a campaign built around fabricated chat logs between her and a young woman named “Zainab,” designed to falsely portray her as encouraging the seduction of General Security personnel.
Amer filed a formal complaint in coordination with the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM). She later learned from ministry insiders that the incitement originated within official WhatsApp groups linked to the Ministry of Information.
During a broadcast of the “Wasat al‑Balad” program, the ministry declined to provide a detailed response, stating only that individuals close to authority are subject to higher standards of accountability. SCM clarified that the handling of such cases depends on individual circumstances and the complainant’s preference regarding formal legal action.
A Recurring Pattern of Digital Targeting
Digital security expert Alaa Ghazal noted that although online campaigns are not new in the region, they have become significantly more sophisticated in content management, tactical coordination, and impact assessment.
The ARIJ investigation concluded that targeting directed at female activists frequently transcends political disagreement, escalating into gender‑based character assassination, personal defamation, and politically or sectarian‑motivated accusations. The evidence demonstrates that these coordinated digital operations routinely spill beyond the online sphere, resulting in reputational harm, the closure of civil society organizations, arbitrary detention, and state judicial measures.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
The post Coordinated Online Campaigns Target Syrian Dissidents and Female Activists first appeared on The Syrian Observer.